10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-1
McKeown’s book, With Power Comes Responsibility: The Politics of Structural Injustice (Bloomsbury 2024) revisits Iris Marion Young’s theory of structural injustice, incorporating critical realism and adding a focus on power dynamics with the aim of clarifying the contours of political responsibility when systemic inequalities are at stake. In this ...
Uğur Bulgan and Valentina Gentile
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-2
This paper will offer a conceptual analysis and critique of Maeve McKeown’s account of structural injustice. McKeown’s main thesis is that structural injustice ought to be approached via critical theory, and that a critical theory of structural injustice should incorporate power. While I agree with McKeown’s general approach, I argue that two aspects ...
Vittorio Bufacchi
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-3
Maeve McKeown’s With Power Comes Responsibility (WPCR) convincingly argues that discussions of structural injustice and responsibility for it should integrate discussions of power relations. Powerful agents have different responsibilities than “ordinary individuals” because they have access to more resources and have more “elbow room” to ...
Mara Marin
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-4
In her new book, Meave McKeown integrates a systematic analysis of power into Iris M. Young’s structural injustice paradigm, providing it with the tools to illuminate different agents’ relative capacities to reproduce structural injustices (SI). While much needed, this investigation – along with the moral responsibility attributions for SIs (instead ...
Rossella De Bernardi
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-5
This commentary argues that McKeown’s use of examples draw out philosophical commitments of her account that are not explicitly thematized in that account. Developing this argument in relation to her reflections on solidarity, it is argued, illustrates how her account negotiates and overcomes a potential tension between two different conceptions of solidarity.
David Owen
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-6
This symposium on my book With Power Comes Responsibility: The Politics of Structural Injustice raised many interesting and important points. I divide my response into two sections. First, friendly amendments. In this section, I discuss David Owen’s points about the role of counter-finalities, symmetrical vs. asymmetrical solidarity, and an ideal theory of ...
Maeve McKeown
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-7
The propagation of fake news has given rise to a pervasive sense of apprehension regarding its ramifications for democratic societies. The disruptive influence of digital technologies has intensified the repercussions of information manipulation and eroded the epistemic foundations of democratic deliberation to an unprecedented degree. Consequently, the dissemination ...
Enrico Biale and Gianfranco Pellegrino
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-8
Most philosophers hold that fake news is intended to deceive, either about its subject matter or about the intentions of those who produce it. I argue that a significant proportion of ‘successful’ fake news – successful in providing political partisans with rhetorical weapons – is not intended to deceive consumers. It is nevertheless relied ...
Neil Levy
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-9
This increasingly salient risk of false information has bearings on philosophy too. The focus of the article is on the ongoing philosophical exchange on the idea of ‘democratized’ or of ‘democratizing’ expertise. The article starts out with presenting three philosophically grounded proposals regarding the democracy-expertise relationship: ...
Cathrine Holst
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-10
Even with events like the Capitol attack, it is misguided to focus too much on the possible epistemic failures of individuals. Instead, the focus should be on the collective underpinnings of bad beliefs (such as false beliefs about a stolen election), and especially on the collective agents who peddle in misinformation. We can divide the collective agents that ...
Säde Hormio
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-11
This paper argues that the harm of fake news lies partly in its inequality-reinforcing effect. It shows how fake news interacts with two background inequalities, namely the unequal distribution of opportunities to become competent knowers and the unequal social status of oppressed minorities. First, I argue that fake news reinforces epistemic inequality among its ...
Laura Santi Amantini
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-12
This paper investigates the strategic role of low-informative signals – conceptualized as fake news – in shaping belief formation and influencing decision-making under uncertainty. Building on the experimental frameworks of Exley (2016) and Garcia et al. (2020), we introduce a novel design that mimics real-world misinformation through signals that are ...
Irene Maria Buso, Margherita Benzi, Marco Novarese, Giacomo Sillari
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-13
In this paper, after an introduction (section 1) we present the two main alternative approaches to the acceptance and spread of fake news (section 2) and we focus on the problem of distinguishing between believing and sharing fake news (section 3). This problem becomes one of the main topics of our empirical study described in sections 4 and 5. In particular, we ...
Margherita Benzi, Irene Maria Buso, Paolo Chirico, Jacopo Marchetti, Marco Novarese, Giacomo Sillari
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-14
It has often been argued that charitable donations are not a sufficient response to global poverty; individuals need to address structural injustice. Proponents of the Effective Altruism (EA) movement have raised two main problems with this focus on structural injustice. In this paper, we respond to these concerns. The first problem raised by EA proponents is that ...
Olga Lenczewska and Kate Yuan
10.17473/2240-7987-2024-2-15
In a landmark philosophy paper (1963), P.F. Strawson argued that moral responsibility is a matter of being able to participate in a “moral community” structured by “reactive attitudes” such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and hurt feelings. On this framework, many, but not all, people are members of the moral community. Exceptions ...
Michelle Ciurria